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INTRODUCTION
In POST'S1 Brief, POST does not respond to, and therefore concedes, two (2) key
issues raised in Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief dated May 28, 2010 (herein "Appeal Brief).
First, that the June 9, 2008, POST Council Meeting Minutes ("POST Minutes") constitute
the official record of the action taken by POST Council, as set forth in the Open Public
Meeting Act, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-203(7) (2008). See, Appeal Brief at p. 27-30, and
Exhibit B to the Addendum attached hereto. Mr. Benson respectfully submits that the
POST Minutes irrefutably establish that the POST Director's improper adoption, carte
blanche, of Administrative Law Judge Luke's (herein "ALJ Luke") Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order ("ALJ Luke's Recommended Order") in the
Final Order constitutes reversible error.
The second key issue that POST fails to respond to, and therefore concedes, is that
ALJ Luke made a critical error in her Order on Motion to Supplement the Hearing
Record2 ("Supplementation Order"). ALJ Luke supplemented the hearing transcript
under the section captioned "cross-examination," as follows: "he [Mr. Benson] testified
that he gave POST the letter from Lyle Lucey [sic] because POST wanted something
from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") not him to verify his reserve status." R.

1. All references herein to the Respondent shall, for convenience, be identified as
"POST").
2. Briefing in this matter was preliminarily stayed to permit correction/supplementation
of the record with the omitted portion of the transcript. R. 1102. The audio recording of
the hearing before ALJ Luke malfunctioned necessitating supplementation of the record.
Specifically, during direct examination of Mr. Benson, the audio recording malfunctioned
such that the direct examination of Mr. Benson by Robert Morton is missing from the
audio recording, however, the audio recording and the transcript fully contain Mr.
Benson's "cross-examination" testimony.
1

1172. However, the audio recording (and transcript) contains the cross-examination of
Mr. Benson and ALJ Luke's foregoing supplementation directly contradicts the transcript.
Thus, ALJ Luke's Supplementation Order as to Mr. Benson's cross-examination
testimony is, at best, superfluous and, in at least one material respect, inconsistent3 with
the record testimony. ALJ Luke's mistaken belief that Mr. Benson testified he gave the
Leo Lucey memo to POST, when in fact, Mr. Lucey, not Mr. Benson, gave the memo to
POST sheds light on how ALJ Luke reached her erroneous finding and conclusion that
Mr. Benson willfully submitted falsified evidence to POST.
In POST'S Brief, POST also asks this Court to impose a double standard by
relieving POST from the obligations set forth in its own administrative rules while at the
same time upholding the "lapse" of Mr. Benson's POST certification4 based on Mr.
Benson's alleged failure to follow the Department of Corrections internal rules.5 On two

3. Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief demonstrates that the memorandum from Mr. Leo Lucey
("the Leo Lucey memo") was irrefutably submitted to POST by Mr. Lucey, not Mr.
Benson. See, Appeal Brief at pages 10, 11,40-43 and footnotes 11, 45-46. A copy of
Mr. Lucey's memo is set forth in Exhibit C to Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief.
4. Significantly, the POST Administrative Complaint in this matter did not seek to deny
reactivation of Mr. Benson's certification by the statutory waiver examination. R. 396402. POST counsel's efforts to "boot strap" the POST Director's Final Order purporting
to uphold the denial of Mr. Benson's POST certification by the statutory waiver
examination is outside the scope of the Administrative Complaint and cannot be upheld.
See, Palmer v. City of Monticello, 731 F.Supp. 1503, 1508 (D.Utah 1990) (holding action
taken against peace officer's employment relating to charges outside the scope of the
notice violated due process).
5. The Utah Legislature has provided that violation of internal departmental rules shall
not constitute a valid legal basis in which to refuse, suspend, revoke or otherwise alter a
peace officer's certification, as follows:
"(4) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures may not be initiated by
2

(2) separate occasions POST asks this Court to issue an order determining that it does not
need to follow its own administrative rules by: (i) alleging that POST Administrative
Rule 728-409-20(A)(l) requiring the POST Director to prepare a final order outlining the
POST Council's decision allegedly violates the governing statute; and/or (ii) ignoring the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof standard adopted by POST Council in
Administrative Rule 728-409-7(4)(c). POST should not be permitted to challenge the
validity of its own rules for the first time on appeal because this issue is outside the scope
of the issues presented in Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief, has not been raised/preserved by
POST in the record below, and POST has failed to file a cross-appeal. See, 438 Main
Street v. Easy Heat,Inc, 2004 UT 72, f 50-51, 99 P.3d 801; McBride v. Carter, 784 P.2d
141, 142 at fn. 2 (Utah 1989); Bluth v. Tax Cornm'n, 2001 UT App 138, 20 P.3d 882
(although UAPA governs judicial review of administrative decisions, it does not govern
judicial review of agency rules).
Finally, throughout POST'S Brief, it repeatedly argues that Mr. Benson willfully
provided misleading information to POST. However, at no point has, or can, POST point
to a single shred of evidence that Mr. Benson provided any written documentation to
POST that was false or misleading - in fact the only such documentation that was ever
raised or argued below was the Leo Lucey memo which was clearly and unequivocally

the council when an officer is terminated for infraction of his agency's
policies, general orders, or similar guidelines of operation that do not
amount to any of the causes for denial suspension, or revocation
enumerated in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (1998)
(Emphasis supplied).
Accord, POST Administrative Rule 728-409-4(B).
3

provided to POST by Mr. Lucey, not Mr. Benson.6 Further, the only statement that was
allegedly made by Mr. Benson to be misleading was the statement to Jayme Gam, POST
Technician, that [Mr. Benson] believed he was a reserve officer,7 not ithat he was in fact a
reserve officer. See, Appeal Brief at p. 16, fh. 15, p. 21-22; R. 737 at p. 27-29.

6. See, Introduction at p. 1-2 hereinabove.
7. POST did not call Jayme Garn to testify - thus the only record and non-hearsay
evidence/testimony regarding what Mr. Benson orally represented to POST is Mr.
Benson's unremitted testimony. Mr. Benson respectfully submits that it constitutes a
violation of the residuum rule for the critical finding to rely solely on inadmissible
hearsay evidence when there is uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. This may be,
perhaps, why ALJ Luke's findings of fact are bereft of any finding that Mr. Benson
willfully made any false statement to Ms. Garn, or POST.
This Court has made the following observations about the application of the residuum
rule to agency decisions:
"Under the residuum rule, all hearsay and other legally inadmissible
evidence admitted by an agency is set aside by the reviewing court. There
must then remain some "residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of
law/' to support the agency's findings and conclusions of law. Yacht Club
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984). If
there is not a residuum of legally competent evidence remaining, the agency
action is reversed. Compare Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481,
486 (Utah 1981) (residuum found after hearsay evidence was set aside) with
Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Utah App. 1987) (no
residuum found after inadmissible evidence was set aside).
... It would be arbitrary and capricious for the CSC to base its decision upon
factual findings that are not supportable by legally competent evidence."
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)
(emphasis supplied).
See also, Prosper, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281,110-11,
168 P.3d 344 (holding findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on inadmissible
hearsay evidence).

4

I
POST IS ESTOPPED FROM REFUSING
MR, BENSON'S CERTIFICATION
POST alleges Mr. Benson is not entitled to equitable relief because Mr. Benson
allegedly has unclean hands. POST'S unclean hands argument should not be well taken
because the only way Mr. Benson could be found to have unclean hands is if there was a
finding by the POST Council (not the POST Director)8 that Mr. Benson "willfully
provided false information to POST,"9 which the POST Council did not find. R. 397,
745-757, 799-800.
Contrary to POST'S argument, Mr. Benson relied on POST'S notification that he
was certifiable (Jayme Gam's letter dated October 3, 2005), as well as subsequent
notification from Lt. Jim Keith in 2005 that it was unnecessary for Mr. Benson to take the

8. See, Argument II hereinbelow.
9. POST takes inconsistent positions by arguing Mr. Benson engaged in willful
falsification in response to Mr. Benson's arguments I, II, IV, and V, and then in argument
III arguing Mr. Benson's certification simply lapsed because he was not serving as a
reserve officer over a four (4) year time period. If, however, Mr. Benson's certification
merely lapsed as POST avers in response to Mr. Benson's disparate treatment claim vis-avis Mr. Lucey, then Mr. Benson is entitled to the equitable relief he requests. In POST'S
Argument III, POST attempts to distinguish Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey on the basis that
Mr. Benson's certification merely lapsed while Mr. Lucey provided false and misleading
information to POST. See, POST'S Brief at p. 15. POST cannot have it both ways - if the
POST Council determined that Mr. Benson provided false information to POST (which Mr.
Benson vigorously disputes) then Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey are similarly situated for
purposes of disparate treatment analysis.

5

statutory waiver examination.

R. 737 at p. 195-203; R. 476. Mr. Benson also relied on

POST'S issuance of his Peace Officer Certification, otherwise he would have taken the
statutory waiver examination at that time.11
II
POST DIRECTOR STEPHENSON'S FINAL ORDER
FAILS TO PROPERLY OUTLINE THE POST
COUNCIL'S DECISION IN VIOLATION OF
STATUTE AND POST ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
A,

The POST Council Determined that Mr, Benson's Certification Lapsed and
Nothing More,
As previously noted in the Introduction at page one (1) hereinabove, POST'S Brief

does not dispute that the POST Minutes are controlling. The POST Minutes dated June 9,
2008, reflect that the only motion made and voted on regarding Mr. Benson was "to
accept the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that Ronald Benson's peace
officer certification lapsed in January 1, 2004." R. 757. See, Exhibit A attached to the

10. Mr. Benson first applied to take the statutory waiver examination in an effort to clear
up any issue regarding his peace officer certification in 2005. In 2005, then POST InService Director, Lieutenant Jim Keith informed Mr. Benson that taking the statutory
waiver examination was unnecessary and that all that he needed to do was submit ten (10)
hours of training credit to POST and his certification would be reactivated. R. 737 at p.
195-203; R. 476. Mr. Benson promptly complied with Lieutenant Keith's directive and
Letisha Shelby, POST technician, at Lieutenant Keith's direction in a letter dated April 26,
2005, reactivated Mr. Benson's certification. R. 737 at p. 195-203; R. 476, 540, 686-689.
11. Scott Carver, then Executive Director of the DOC, included in his response to the
Legislative Audit that Mr. Benson had indicated he was willing, at all times, to take the
statutory waiver examination. R. 669. Mike Hanks also testified that Mr. Benson
indicated he was willing to take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 49. Mr.
Benson also testified that he was willing to take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737
at p. 288.

6

Addendum hereto. Thus, POST'S Brief misconstrues the POST Minutes by attempting to
incorporate ALJ Luke's entire Recommended Order, as well as the director's alleged
refusal to accept to reactivate Mr. Benson's peace officer certification by statutory waiver
examination. POST Minutes, much like statutory construction, should be interpreted
based on the plain language. See, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)
(when construing questions of statutory construction, the court will first examine the plain
language of the statute).
In POST'S Brief at p. 13, POST takes a statement from Sheriff Bud Cox out of
context and argues the POST Council accepted ALJ Luke's entire Recommended Order
without alteration or change, including ALJ Luke upholding the Director's purported
exercise of discretion requiring Mr. Benson to attend POST training to recertify. R. 326327. POST'S argument fails, however, because contrary to ALJ Luke's Recommended
Order, during the June 9, 2008, POST Council meeting, the POST Council withdrew a
motion which would require Mr. Benson to go through POST training as opposed to
taking the statutory waiver examination.12 R. 738 at p. 50-52.
In POST'S Brief at p. 12-13, POST also misconstrues Sheriff Cox's record
comment as referencing ALJ Luke's Decision when in fact Sheriff Cox is referencing the

12. During discussion after Sheriff Cox's motion passed, a second motion was made that
Mr. Benson would need to attend POST training to recertify as opposed to taking the
statutory/waiver examination - this second motion was withdrawn without vote. R. 738
at 50-52. Although POST'S Brief relies on the transcript of the POST Council meeting
(contained in R. 738), the POST Minutes not the transcript are controlling under Utah
Code Ann. §52-4-203(7), as discussed in the Introduction at page 1 hereinabove.

7

POST Investigations Bureau Case Summary ("POST Case Summary"). See, POST'S
Brief at p. 13. The direct quote from the transcript of the June 9, 2008, POST Council
meeting reveals that Sheriff Cox is referring to the POST Case Summary, not to ALJ
Luke's Recommended Order that POST refers to as follows:
"The motion is merely what is stated on the action from POST
investigations, and that - in fact, I read it, so that I wouldn't
get it wrong." R. 738 at 47.
The POST investigative action Sheriff Cox is referencing is included as a part of
the POST Minutes.13 R. 799-800. Nowhere does the POST Case Summary recommend
that ALJ Luke's entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order be
adopted, in toto. The POST Case Summary consists of a two (2) page document that
identifies two (2) allegations: falsification of information to obtain certified status and
lapsed certification. The POST Case Summary also includes the following sections "Administrative Law Judge's Recommendation" (which only includes the lapse in
certification, nothing more), "statutory violation" (which only includes Utah Code Ann. §
53-6-208, lapsed certification), and "POST'S Recommendation" (a verbatim statement of
Sheriff Cox's Motion).14

13. The POST Minutes were previously included at Exhibit M to the Addendum to Brief
of Appellant. For the Court's convenience, so that it may readily juxtapose the POST
Minutes and Case Summaries for Mr. Benson and Chief Halliday, highlighted copies are
attached hereto as Exhibits A.
14. "POST recommends that the Council accept the ALJ's Ruling that Benson's
certification lapsed on January 1, 2004." See, R. 738 at p. 46, 757 & 799.
8

The POST Case Summary for Mr. Benson included as an addendum to the POST
Minutes only references the lapsing statute (Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-208) not the willful
falsification statute (§53-6-211) as a basis for the POST action taken against Mr. Benson.
Contrary to POST'S Brief at p. 12-13, the POST Council had a clear understanding of the
difference between an action being taken regarding peace officer certification issues that
involve mere lapsing of certification (i.e., Mr. Benson) versus willful falsification of
information to obtain certification (i.e., Chief Halliday). That the POST Council intended
to rely on the lapsing statute as the exclusive statutory basis for the action taken against
Mr. Benson is demonstrated by comparing and juxtaposing the POST Case Summary for
Mr. Benson with the POST Case Summary for Chief Michael Halliday ("Chief
Halliday"), whose case was considered during the same POST Council meeting held on
June 9, 2008. See, Exhibit A attached to the Addendum hereto.
The POST Case Summary in Chief Halliday's case identifies the statutory basis of
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(1 )(d)(i) - which is willful falsification of information to
obtain certified status. R. 759, 801-802. In Chief Halliday's case, POST voted to impose
a two (2) year suspension of Chief Halliday's peace officer certification for his willful
falsification of information to obtain peace officer certification. R. 759, 801-802. Had
the POST Council determined Mr. Benson had willfully falsified information to obtain
peace officer status, the POST Council would most assuredly have imposed the same
penalty (i.e., a two (2) year suspension) against Mr. Benson's peace officer certification
that it imposed against Chief Halliday - to do otherwise is arbitrary and capricious

9

imposition of disparate treatment. R. 759, 756-757, 799-802.
B.

The POST Director Does Not Have Authority to Refuse, Sospend or Revoke
Peace Officer Certification.
The POST Director does not have the authority to issue a decision that Mr.

Benson's peace officer certification lapsed without the POST Council's approval. In its
Brief, POST erroneously argues the POST Council's general duties15 contained in §53-6107(l)(a)(ii) that "the council shall... advise the director..." somehow confers exclusive
authority on the POST Director. POST conveniently ignores Utah Code Ann. §53-6-211
(2008),16 which provides:
"(l)(a) The director may, upon the concurrence of the
majority of the council revoke, refuse, or suspend
certification of a peace officer for cause..." Id. (emphasis
supplied)
Nowhere does the plain language of either §53-6-211 or §53-6-107 authorize the
POST Director to take action against a peace officer certification absent concurrence of a
majority vote of the POST Council. Pursuant to POST'S authority to promulgate rules,
POST adopted Administrative Rule 728-409-20(1), as follows:
"R728-409-20. Director's Final Order.
A. In adjudicative proceedings:
1. After a majority of the council recommends to refuse,
suspend or revoke respondent's peace officer, correctional
15. The heading to §53-6-107 is captioned "General Duties of Council."
16. A classic rule of statutory construction is that specific provisions prevail over more
general expressions. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1980).
The specific statutory provision that the POST Director may take action with the
concurrence of POST Council contained in §53-6-211 (2008) is certainly more specific
than the "General Duties of Council" contained in § 53-6-107.
10

officer, reserve/auxiliary officer, or special function officer
certification, or to take no action against respondent, the
director shall prepare and issue a final order within 30 days
outlining the council's decision.
2. The final order will include information on the appeal
process as outlined in administrative rules R728-409-21, 22, 23.
3. The director shall upon issuance, serve a copy of the
final order on the respondent and the employing agency by
certified mail." (Emphasis supplied)
It is well established case law that an agency is bound by its own rules, to-wit:
"'[Administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable
and valid and cannot be ignored or followed by the agency to
suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary and
capricious action/ State ex rel Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980).
By ignoring its own rules, UDOT acted arbitrarily and
capriciously." R.O.A. General v. Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d
840, 842 (Utah 1998).
Despite the well established case law that an Agency's failure to follow its own rules
constitutes an arbitrary and capricious action, POST asks this Court to determine that its
own Administrative Rule 728-409-20(1) is inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211
(1998) and therefore should not be enforced against it. Administrative Rule 728-40920(1)(2008) authorizing the Director to issue the final order outlining the decision
recommended by the POST Council majority is consistent with the plain language set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(a) (1998) which permits the Director to revoke, refuse or
suspend peace officer certification for cause only upon the concurrence of the majority of
the council. Further, recent legislation confirms POST Rule 728-409-20(1) is consistent

11

with the legislature's intent to authorize POST Council to take action against a peace
officer's certification.18 See, Exhibit D attached to the Addendum hereto.
Ill
POST'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE MR. BENSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WAS VIOLATED WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON
MR. BENSON'S DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM
VIS-A-VIS LEO LUCEY
As previously noted, POST'S argument in response to Mr. Benson's disparate
treatment claim is inconsistent with its position in arguments I, II, IV & V. See, footnote
9 hereinabove. POST takes the position that Mr. Benson's circumstance is not
comparable to Mr. Lucey because Mr. Lucey allegedly provided false and misleading
information to POST for the benefit of Mr. Benson,19 while Mr. Benson's peace offer
certification simply lapsed after four (4) years of inactivity, to-wit:
"Benson's certification was refused because he was found not
to have served as a reserve peace officer during the four years
17. The current version of §53-6-211(1) provides that:
'The council has authority to suspend or revoke the certification of a peace
officer... " Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(1) (2010) (as amended) (emphasis
supplied).
18. Statutory amendments clarifying a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative
declaration of the original act. In re D.B. v. State of Utah, 925 P.2d 178 (Utah Ct.App.
1996).
19. It appears that Mr. Lucey's circumstance is virtually identical to Chief Halliday who
suffered a two (2) year suspension for willful falsification of information to obtain
certification. The notion that Mr. Lucey experienced no sanction demonstrates that POST
acted in an inconsistent fashion vis-a-vis the circumstances regarding Mr. Benson and
Chief Halliday. See, Argument at p. 8-9 hereinabove.
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he was out of law enforcement as he had claimed. There is no
claim that Lucey was erroneously certified when he had not
actually been serving as a peace officer. At most he could be
accused of providing false or misleading information
concerning whether or not Benson had been a peace officer.
There is no showing that Benson and Lucey are similarly
situated." See, POST'S Brief at p. 15.20
Neither ALJ Luke, the POST Council, nor the POST Director issued any finding
or made any conclusion that Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey are not similarly situated. The
only written evidence in this matter that was allegedly false or misleading was the Leo
Lucey memo, however, no action has been taken by POST against Mr. Lucey's peace
officer certification. Thus, Mr. Benson properly raised the disparate treatment claim
which has never been ruled upon in violation of Mr. Benson's due process rights as
previously held by this Court in Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994) and Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah Ct.App.
1991).
Since Mr. Lucey authored and provided the Leo Lucey memo to POST, and the
Leo Lucey memo is what POST has relied on as the lynchpin evidence to demonstrate
willful falsification of information in this matter,21 Mr. Lucey would have been complicit

20. If POST wants to concede that Mr. Benson's certification merely lapsed, then
POST'S Final Order should be reversed because there is no statutory basis to uphold the
refusal of Mr. Benson's certification because the statute requires willful falsification something only Mr. Lucey can be accused of on the record of these proceedings. See,
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(d) (1998).
21. As previously noted, Mr. Benson submits the Leo Lucey memo is neither false or
misleading. See, Appeal Brief at p. 43-48.
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if his conduct involved willful falsification and is therefore similarly situated for the
purpose of disparate treatment analysis. See, Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Service Comm'n,
2004 UT App 375, <H 6, 7, 101 P.3d 394 (holding that peace officers who were found
guilty of misconduct in the same internal affairs investigation were similarly situated for
the purpose of disparate treatment analysis). POST'S position that it is fair and rational to
treat Mr. Lucey and Mr. Benson differently on the basis that Mr. Benson's certification
lapsed, and all that Mr. Lucey did was allegedly provide false or misleading information,
is neither fair, rational, or consistent with POST'S practices.
IV
POST COUNCIL ACTED CONTRARY TO ITS
PRIOR PRACTICE BY IGNORING MR. BENSON'S
SUCCESSFUL PASSING OF THE STATUTORY
WAIVER EXAMINATION
POST abused its discretion by failing to accept Mr. Benson's successful passing of
the statutory waiver examination as curing any certification deficiencies. The failure to
rule on a party's legal argument constitutes an abuse of discretion and is a violation of
due process. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23., 32 (Utah Ct.App.
1991). ALJ Luke's Recommended Order dated February 28, 2008, states that "the

22. In Lt. Winward's Investigative report, he concludes that,
"The issue of the falsification of documentation to obtain peace officer
status is undetermined. Based on the information gathered and individuals I
contacted it is difficult to determine if the memo produced by Leo Lucey in
September of 2003 was done under false pretenses." R. 533.
Clearly, POST was aware of Mr. Lucey's involvement, yet no action was taken against
Mr. Lucey's certification.
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Director of POST has refused reinstatement by waiver exam," is not supported by any
record evidence/testimony nor any written decision from the POST Director prior to ALJ
Luke's Recommended Order. In POST'S Final Order dated June 11, 2008, a written
order issued by POST Director Stephenson, he avers that:
"POST Council affirms and adopts the Administrative Law
Judge's Recommendation and Order that the Director's
refusal to reinstate the certification by waiver examination
was within his authority, discretion and was appropriate." R.
387.
The Final Order is made almost four (4) months after ALJ Luke's Recommended
Order, thus begs the question - how can ALJ Luke make a recommendation upholding
the POST Director's decision when there is no record evidence demonstrating that the
decision was ever made?23 POST Director Stephenson, writes the Final Order in the
third person as if the Director already made the refusal to reinstate by waiver
examination, however no such written decision was ever received or has been introduced
in the proceedings below.24 POST Council's efforts to boot strap POST Director

23. Richard Townsend was the Director of POST at the time of the initiation of the POST
investigation (January 2006) and the issuance of the Administrative Complaint (May 2006).
R. 527, 394, 399. There was a change in the director by the time of the Final Order was
issued in June of 2006, to POST Director Scott Stephenson. R. 745; 386-387.
24. Specifically, POST Director Stephenson's Final Order also claims that a "key issue"
in the POST Administrative Complaint was whether the Director of POST properly
exercised his authority and discretion in denying Mr. Benson's request to recertify by the
statutory waiver examination, yet another statement not supported by the record. R. 386.
However, nowhere in POST'S Administrative Complaint is there an allegation that the
POST Director has exercised his discretion to accept Mr. Benson's successful passing of
the statutory waiver examination. R. 396-402.
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Stephenson's purported exercise of discretion that was never presented in the proceeding
before ALJ Luke is, by definition, arbitrary and capricious. Further, POST'S attempt to
distinguish Mr. Benson and Mike Hanks (the peace officer who was permitted to
recertify by statutory waiver examination after a seven (7) year lapse), fails because
POST did not find Mr. Benson engaged in willful submission of falsification information
to POST. See, Argument Sections 2 & 5 herein.

V
POST'S FINAL ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
A,

POST Should not be Permitted to Abandon the Preponderance of the
Evidence Burden of Proof Standard Adopted Under POST Administrative
Rules,
POST is asking this Court to repudiate the preponderance of the evidence burden

of proof standard adopted by POST'S own administrative rule as somehow conflicting
with the substantial evidence standard of review contained in Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") at §63G-4-403(4)(g).26 POST'S argument should not be well
taken because our appellate courts have previously held it is the essence of an arbitrary
and capricious action for an agency to disregard its own rules. See, R.O.A, General v.
UtahDep'tofTransp., 966 P.2d 840 (Utah 1998), Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah

25. POST Administrative Rule 728-409-7(c) (2008). See, Exhibit Z attached to Mr.
Benson's Appeal Brief.
26. This Court also has the authority to reverse POST'S Final Order under Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-4-403(h)(ii) because POST'S failure to carry its burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence is in violation of POST'S Administrative Rule 728-4097(c) (2008). See, Exhibit W to Addendum to Appeal Brief.
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Merit System Council 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980); see also. Brown v. United States, 377
F.Supp. 530, 539 (N.D. Texas 1974) ("It is basic due process that the Government cannot
set up regulations and then disregard them").
POST'S adoption of a higher burden of proof standard conforms with the minimum
97

98

requirements of UAPA and is therefore consistent with its legislative design.

In the

2010 Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211, by
adopting the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard on POST in proceedings
regarding a peace officer's certification while retaining the existing preponderance of
evidence standard as to a peace officer's burden as to proving an affirmative defense.
27. UAPA does not preclude the adoption of rules in conformity with UAPA, to-wit:
"(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule
affecting or governing an adjudicative proceeding or from following the
rule, if the rule is enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63G,
Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rule conforms
to the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(6)
(2008) (emphasis supplied).
So long as POST does not adopt a lower burden of proof, a higher standard would
remain in conformity with the minimum requirements set forth in UAPA.
28. POST'S reliance on Draughon v. Utah Dep't of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT App
42, 975 P.2d 935, is misplaced. Draughon stands for the proposition that an agency's rule
that conflicts with its organic statute is invalid. Draughon involved the Department of
Human Resource Management's ("DHRM") adoption of rules under the DHRM statute,
drawing a distinction between a "demotion" and an "involuntary reassignment" on the
basis of immediate loss of pay. The Court held the distinction was illusory and therefore
invalid. POST does not claim that it did not have authority to enact Administrative Rule
728-409-7(c) or that this rule is inconsistent with its organic statute but only that this rule
conflicts with a separate statute, UAPA, and is therefore invalid. Since Administrative
Rule 728-409-7(c) is consistent with the Legislative design of UAPA, Draughon does not
support POST'S argument.
17

See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(3)(d)(i) & (ii) (2010).29 POST'S argument that the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, under the former statute, is inconsistent
with the legislative design must fail because the Utah Legislature has adopted an even
higher burden of proof than is contained in POST's administrative rules (and UAPA).
Mr. Benson respectfully submits that under either standard of review,30 he has
properly marshaled the evidence and the challenged findings of "willful submission of
falsified instruction" and the POST Director's denial of Mr. Benson's certification by
statutory waiver examination are not supported by the record evidence.
B.

Mr. Benson Properly Marshaled the Evidence Warranting Reversal of the
POST Final Order.
POST's Brief suggests that Mr. Benson did not properly marshal the evidence. At

page 35 in his Appeal Brief, Mr. Benson clearly identified the two (2) challenged findings
as follows:
"POST failed to present sufficient evidence to prove upon a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) Mr. Benson willfully
submitted falsified information to obtain peace officer
29. See, Exhibit D to the Addendum attached hereto.
30. Under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the party bearing the burden of
proof must "demonstrate that its existence is more likely than not." See, Harken
Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996).
Under the standard substantial evidence standard of review, evidence, by definition, is not
substantial if it (1) is based on mere conclusions; (2) is contrary to the overwhelming
evidence presented at the hearing; or (3) runs afoul of the residuum rule. See, A.M.L. v.
Dep't of Health, 863 P.2d 44,47 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (finding evidence is not substantial
if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or based on mere conclusions); Lucas v. Murray
City Civil Service Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also, footnote 7,
hereinabove.
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certification and (2) the POST Director improperly exercised
his discretion to deny Mr. Benson's certification by statutory
waiver examination." Appeal Brief at p. 35.
It is clear that Mr. Benson has challenged findings of fact numbered 16 & 17.31
Finding of fact no. 16 provides, in part:
"In obtaining and submitting the letter to POST in an effort to
counter a finding that his certification had lapsed he [Mr.
Benson] willfully submitted falsified information to POST to
obtain certified status." R. 326.
Mr. Benson argued that the finding of willful falsification is not supported by the
record because there is no evidence that he willfully submitted any false information to
POST.32 See, Appeal Brief at p. 36-48. Clearly, Mr. Benson has challenged finding
number 16.
Without citation to the record contrary to Rule 24(a)(7) Ut.R.App.P., POST
continuously maintains that because Mr. Benson represented to POST that he served as a

31. POST's Brief makes issue of the fact that in marshaling the evidence, Mr. Benson
does not identify the findings of fact he is disputing by number. POST'S Brief does not
provide a citation to any appellate rule or appellate decision from this Court, other legal
authority requiring the challenged facts to be identified by number. Mr. Benson
respectfully submits that the facts he is challenging are clearly identified and are
appropriately marshaled in his Appeal Brief.
32. For example, the Jayme Gam letter of October 1, 2003, in response to the Leo Lucey
memo, merely indicated that Mr. Benson was certifiable as of that date. R. 475.
Inasmuch as Mr. Benson had been out of active employment in the law enforcement field
for less than four (4) years at that time, Mr. Benson was certifiable regardless of whether
the Leo Lucey memo was received. Had POST actually relied on the Leo Lucey memo to
establish that Mr. Benson was in fact a reserve officer, Ms. Garn's letter would have said
that Mr. Benson was fully certified - not merely certifiable.
19

reserve peace officer,33 this somehow supports a finding of willful falsification of records
and constitutes a valid legal basis in which to refuse his certification by statutory waiver
examination. See, Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1978) (holding our appellate courts need not consider any facts not properly cited to or
supported by the record). ALJ Luke did not make a finding that Mr. Etenson represented
to POST that he was, in fact, a reserve peace officer.34 Further, the only written evidence
containing any allegedly falsified information submitted to POST was the Leo Lucey
memo. However, Mr. Benson did not write the Leo Lucey memo and did not provide the
Leo Lucey memo to POST. Thus, Mr. Benson did not provide any information to POST
that could possibly support a finding of willfully submitting falsified information by
either substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence.35

33. See, POST'S Brief at p. 8,9, 17&20.
34. Our appellate courts have previously held that an agency's failure to make a
necessary finding is arbitrary and capricious:
"[T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact in material
issues renders its findings "arbitrary and capricious " unless the evidence is
"clear and uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. Id. at 4-5
(quoting Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm% 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990)
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)). We may not,
however, assume that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. Id. at 5.
The party defending the agency's action bears the burden of showing that
the undisclosed finding was actually made. Id." Hidden Valley Const. Co.,
v. Utah Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 866 P.2d 564, 568 (Utah Ct.App.
1993).
35. It is important to note that there have not been any allegations that Mr. Benson lied
under oath or did not tell the truth under garrity warning in this matter. Upon presentation
of the Department of Corrections internal reserve officer policy, Mr. Benson consistently
20

Finding of fact number 17 provides, in part:
"Mr. Benson has passed the test but the Director of POST has
refused to recertify him without readmission and graduation
from the POST academy." R. 326.
Mr. Benson marshaled the evidence and demonstrated that there was no record
evidence presented to ALJ Luke that the POST Director made any determination and/or
formally denied Mr. Benson's certification36 incident to his successful passing of the
statutory waiver examination prior to ALJ Luke's Recommended Order issued on
February 28, 2008. See, Appeal Brief at p. 48-50. Clearly Mr. Benson has challenged
finding number 17.

testified under oath and garrity warning, that although he previously believed he was a
reserve officer, in hindsight he admitted he did not follow the Department's internal
reserve officer policy to the letter. See, Appeal Brief at p. 45-48. In any event, this is
insufficient evidence to uphold a finding of willfulness under either the substantial
evidence or preponderance of the evidence standard.
36. Lt. Winward's testimony that Mr. Benson's certification by waiver examination was
"in essence" denied constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence in violation of the
residuum rule because no written documentation was presented and the POST Director
was not called to testify. See, footnote 7 hereinabove.
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Mr. Benson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the POST Final Order and
order POST to reinstate Mr. Benson's peace officer certification, effective March 4, 2004.
DATED this _ J

day of

fchW

, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,
DYER LAW GROUP PLLC

PhillipAV. Dfyer, Esq.
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant Ron Benson
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Tab A

MINUTES OF JUNE 9,2008
POST MEETING RE:

1. Ronald W. Benson
2.

Chief Michael Halliday

Motion:

Second;
Vote;

Robby Robertson motioned to accept Jeremy Davenport's signed
consent
agreement for a four-year suspension of his Peace Officer
Certification.
(6/9/2008 - 6/9/2008)
Ben Jones seconded the motion.
The motion passed with all in favor.

M I C H A E L JOHNSON - (Inappropriate use of technology)
•Appendix A-18

Aggravating Circumstances; On-duty; Willingness to participate in conduct; Supervisory
authority; Repetitiveness of conduct.
Mitigating Circumstances: None.

Motion;

Second;
Vote:

Sheriff Dave Edmunds motioned to accept Michael Johnson's
signed
consent agreement for a two-year suspension of his Peace Officer
Certification.
(6/9/2008-6/9/2008)
Sheriff Mike Lacy seconded the motion.
The motion passed with all in favor.

R O N A L D W . BENSON - (Falsification of information to obtain certified status, Lapsed
certification)
*AppendixA-19

I Aggravating Circumstances: None.
[ Mitigating Circumstances: None.

Attorney Robert Morton informed the Council Ron Benson and his Counsel were present to
appeal the Administrative Law Judge's ruling. Atty. Morton gave a brief summary of the case
and told the Council the allegations in this case were: Falsification of information to obtain
certified status and a lapsed certification.
The ALJ's findings were that during a four-year period (January 2000 - March 2004): 1) Benson
was not engaged in performing the duties of a law enforcement officer and as such his
certification had lapsed and is subject to the provision of Utah Code Annotated 53-6-208 which
requires him to go back threw the academy to attain certification. 2) Benson submitted falsified
documents to POST.
Atty. Morton requested POST Council to uphold the ALJ ruling and require Benson to go
through the academy if he is to work as a peace officer.
Attorney Phil Dyer, representing Ron Benson, addressed the Council Atty. Dyer presented a
rebuttal to the AJL's ruling and requested the Council to rescind the ALJ's decision and
exonerate Benson through no action. Atty. Dyer would like the ALJ ruling expunged from Mr.
i?

Benson's file if the Council grants Benson's the appeal.

There was discussion held by Council members on the topic of reserve officer status and UDC
reserve officer policy. Bud Cox expressed concern about Benson having worked for a couple of
years in a certified position before this information was discovered. After reading the ALJ r s
findings and facts he made the following motion.
Motion:

Second:
Vote:

Sheriff Bud Cox motioned to accept the Administrative Law Judge's
recommendation that Ronald Benson's peace officer certification lapsed
January 1, 2004.
Sheriff Mike Lacy seconded the motion.
The motion passed with 9 in favor and 1 against (Deputy Director Mike
Haddon recused himself from voting on this motion.)

in

Request for Reconsideration:
GEORGE ZAMANTAKIS - (Sexual Misconduct, Lying under Garrity)
Zamantakis' Attorney, Matt Jube, addressed the Council. He indicated Zamantakis does not
feel his action's should go undisciplined, but feels a suspension is more appropriate over
revocation. According to the guidelines, the sexual misconduct offense is a category uDn offence
with a two-year baseline suspension and lying under Garrity is a category UC offence with a
three-year baseline suspension. Counsel Jube also listed several factors he felt should be
included as mitigators for this case:
• First offence
• Public support
• FBI letter
• Letter from mayor
• Agency support
Zamantakis denies having sexual relations at his home or at the work place. He took
responsibility and resigned from his position. Counsel Jube requested a suspension of his
peace officer certification in lieu of revocation.
George Zamantakis addressed the Council and stated he owes the Council and LL Winward an
apology for his actions. He worked very hard to become a chief and worked hard for his
officers. He has since made his family the priority in his life. His wife Misty Zamantakis
addressed the Council in support of her husband.
Guy Mills the former husband of the employee Zamantakis had the affair with, addressed the
Council. He testified before the Council that Zamantakis lied to him for years about the affair
and tried to convince his ex-wife to lie about the relationship. He feels Zamantakis should never
return to law enforcement.
Counsel Jube re-approached the Council and stated Zamantakis has the support of the
community and is assisting the new chief with his duties.
Bud Cox asked if any facts of the case have changed since last POST Council meeting w h e n
this case was first heard. LL Winward indicated the facts of the case have not changed and
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M I C H A E L HALLIDAY - (False Information to Obtain Peace Officer Certification)
*Appendix A-20

Aggravating Circumstances: Position of Authority.
Mitigating Circumstances: None.

Counsel Morton informed the POST Council this case was previously heard and ruled on by an
ALJ. InitiaHy Halliday-was going to appeal the ALTs ruling in person, but has encountered
health problems precluding him from appearing before the Council. He has requested in a letter
for POST Council not to suspend his Peace Officer Certification. Via written correspondence,
his Counsel asked the press to use discretion in light of Hallida/s current health problems.
Based on the fact of the case the ALJ recommends a two-year suspension.
Dave Edmunds stated POST must be able to rely on chief executives to accurately report
training hours to ensure the integrity of their departments' reserve program. When a
department reports training hours for a program that doesn't even exist POST Council needs to
take swift and sever action.
Motion:
Second;
Discussion:

Sheriff Dave Edmunds motioned to revoke Michael Halliday's Peace
Certification.
Deputy Director Mike Haddon seconded the motion.

Officer

Donna Dillingham-Evans stated this was poor administration, poor judgment* and
poor interpretation. But the chief did not gain anything by doing this. So what
was his reason for falsifying the documentation? Scott Stephenson stated the
certification is valuable because it enables them to-come back to the profession
in the future.
Scott Stephenson emphasized POST does not have the resources to police
every reserve officer program in the state. When Holladay reported 40 hours for
an officer that lived on the Wasatch front ft raised serious concerns and
questions at POST.
Chairman Nelson stated retirees have asked him to place them on his
department's reserve roster. However, once they realize the work requirements,
they change their minds. There are three requirements to be a reserve officer 1 be on a roster, 2- be engaged in faw enforcement duties and 3- complete 40
hours of in-service training. Mike Larsen stated, retired officers listed on his
reserve roster work at his discretion in the capacity that supports his department
He would hate to see POST restrict the usage of a reserve program. Dave
Edmunds does not think POST or the Council wants to regulate the reserve
program, he just feels when someone is found misrepresenting the program they
should be disciplined.

Sub-Motion:
Second:
Vote:

Chief Vaf Shupe motioned to accept the ALJ's recommendation for a twoyear suspension of Michael Hailiday's peace officer
certification.
Robbie Robertson seconded the motion.
The motion passed with 6 in favor and 4 against (Sheriff Lacy abstained)
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POST INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU
CASE SUMMARY RE:

1. Ronald W. Benson
2. Chief Michael Halliday

From Appendix to June 9,2008 POST Minutes

POST Investigations Bureau
CASE SUMMARY
Case No: 07-003LE
Subject: Ronald W. Benson
Investigator: Steven Winward

ALLEGATIONS)
Falsification of Information to Obtain Certified Status
Lapsed Certification
POST INVESTIGATION OF A L L E G A T I O N S
Ronald W. Benson employed by the Salt Lake Comity Sheriffs Office as a correctional
officer in April of 1978. In April of 1987 Ron Benson resigned employment at Salt Lake
Cotmty and was hired by the Utah Department of Correction (UDC). During his time at
U D C he attained his certification as a law enforcement officer. On November 2,199S,
Benson retired from UDC and was hired by the Department of Insurance as a criminal
investigator. On January 1,2000, Benson resigned from the Department of tisurance and
sought employment in the private sector as a civilian.
In the Fall of 2003, Benson contacted POST and requested his certification be reinstated.
He provided POST with a letter from a supervisor at UDC that stated that he had a
reserve application on file with corrections and submitted training hours for each year h e
was ont of law enforcement Based upon the information provided by Benson^ POST
updated his records. In March of 2004, UDC hired Benson as an Adult Probation and
Parole Officer.
In December 2006, the Legislative General Auditors Office conducted an audit on U D C .
In the audit, Benson's Peace Officer Certification reactivation was called into question*
The audit's inquiry into his certified status precipitated Benson to contact POST to
reactivate his peace officer status. During the reactivation process, POST found
inaccuracies in Ms application. As a result of the inaccuracies, POST opened an
investigation.
On January 19,2007> Benson was interviewed by POST. After being issued a Garrity
warning, Benson stated he worked as a reserve officer by passing along information b e
received from informants. A letter provided by a UDC supervisor implied Benson was a
reserye officer with UDC during the time be was out of law enforcement The POST
investigation determined that he did not fimction as a reserve officer as outlined by U D C
policies and procedures.

In May 2007 an administrative complaint was filed against Benson. Benson, through his
attorney Phil Dyer, responded to the complaint On December 18,2007, an
administrative hearing was scheduled and held in front of Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Cheryl Luke.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RECOMMENDATION
On December 18,2007, ALJ Cheryl Luke heard administrative complaint against Ron
Benson.
On February 29,2008, ALJ Cheryl Luke ruled, "Mr. Benson was not engaged in the
duties of a law enforcement officer from January 1, 2000 to March 2004. His
certification lapsed and is subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 53-6-208."

VIOLATIONS
Benson's actions violated the following:
I. Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-208 lapsed certification
AGGRAVATING CIRCTJMSTANCEfS)
None
MITIGATING CERCUMSTANCEfS)
None
POST RECOMMENDATION
POST recommends the Council accept the ALPs ruling that Benson's certification lapsed
on January 1,2004.
POST-COUNCIL ACTION

FINAL ORDER

POST Investigations Bureau
CASE SUMMARY
Case No: 07-039LE
Subject: Michael Halliday
Investigator: Steven Winward

ALLEGATIONS)
False Information To Obtain Peace Officer Certification
POST INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
Michael Halliday was employed and certified as a deputy sheriff with San Juan County
Sheriffs Office on May 21,1976. On September 1,1987, Blanding Police Department
(BPD) hired Halliday and he was subsequently named as Chief of Police.
In August 2007, Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) human resources contacted POST to obtain
certification information on Danny Flannery whom they had hired POST discovered b e
had not worked in law enforcement for over three-years and did not have in-service
training reported to POST during that time frame. F l a n n e l s UHP application included a
letter from Chief Milce Halliday stating that Flannery was a BPD reserve officer and b e
maintained his training hours. However, Flannery did not list reserve work on his UHP
application. His application reflected he was in Iraq working as a private contractor for
approximately two years. POST determined the letter written by Halliday> on behalf of
Flannery, was fabricated. POST opened an investigation on both parties.
POST contacted Mayor Tom Turk of Blanding City to discuss the reserve program.
Mayor Turk stated Blanding has never had an approved reserve program. Mayor Turk
conducted an independent investigation and learned Chief Halliday was reporting hours
for two officers who had quit the department Halliday reported in-service training hours
to POST on behalf of two additional officers under the guise they were reserve officers
for BPD.
On August 14,2007, POST interviewed Halliday. Halliday stated he had a reserve
program of former officers that he could call on for special events or special enforcement
needs. Halliday admitted that the city administrators had not approved the reserve
program. Halliday sold he thought he had the right, as the administrator, to have a
reserve program setup in this fashion.
POST reviewed the records of several officers named by Halliday. POST verified the
officers named by Halliday, with the exception of one, did not work in any law
enforcement capacity since leaving BPD.

A-2Q

An administrative complaint was sent out to Halliday seeking suspension of his Peace
Officer Certification. Halhday responded to the complaint A hearing was scheduled in
front of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) J. Richard Catten.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RECOMMENDATION
On February 14,2008, a hearing was held to suspend the certification of Mike Halliday's
Peace Officer Certification before the ALJ. The ALJ ruled Halliday violated the Law
Enforcement Code of Ethics. ALJ Catten recommended Halliday^s Peace Officer
Certification be suspended for two-years.

VIOLATIONS)
Halliday*s actions violated the following:
1. Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (I)(d)(i) williul falsification of any information to obtain
certified status
2. Administrative Code R728-409-3 (A) in that he violated the Law Enforcement Code of
Ethics.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Position of Authority
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
None
POST RECOMMENDATION
POST recommends the Council accept the recommendation of the ALJ and impose a two
year suspension of Chief Halliday's Peace Officer CertificatiocL
POST COUNCIL ACTION

FINAL ORDER

TabB
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CHAPTER4

OPEN AND PUBUC MEETINGS ACT
Section
52-4-1 to 52-4-10. Renumbered as §§ 52-4-102 to 52-4-207
52-4-302 to 52-4-304.

Parti
General Provisions
52-4-101.
52-4-102.
52-4-103.
52-4-104.

Title.
Declaration of public policy.
Definitions,
Training.
Part 2
Meetings

52-4-201.
52-4-202.
52-4-203.
52-4-204.
52-4-205.
52-4-206.
52-4-207.
52-4-208.

Meetings open to the public — Exceptions.
Public notice of meetings — Emergency meetings.
Minutes of open meetings — Public records —
Recording of meetings.
Closed meeting held upon vote of members —
Business — Reasons for meeting recorded.
Purposes of closed meetings.
Record of closed meetings.
Electronic meetings —Authorization — Requirements.
Chance or social meetings.
Part 3
Enforcement

52-4-301.
52-4-302.
52-4-303.
52-4-304.
52-4-305.

Disruption of meetings.
Suit to void final action - Limitation — Exceptions.
Enforcement of chapter - Suit to compel compliance.
Action challenging closed meeting.
Criminal penalty for closed meeting violation.

52-4-1 t o 52-4-10. Renumbered as §§ 52-4-102 t o 52-4207, 52-4-502 to 52-4-304.
2006
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
52-4-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Open and Public Meetings
Act."
aoo*
52-4-102. Declaration of public policy.
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the state, its
agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct
of the people's business.
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that the state, its
agencies, and its political subdivisions:
(a) take their actions openly; and
(b) conduct their deliberations openly.
2006
52-4-103. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Anchor location" means the physical location from
which:
(a) an electronic meeting originates; or
(b) the participants are connected.
(2) "Convening** means the calling of a meeting of a
public body by a person authorized to do so for the express
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purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which
that public body has jurisdiction or advisory power.
(3) "Electronic meeting" means a public meeting convened or conducted by means of a conference using
electronic communications.
(4) (a) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body,
with a quorum present, including a workshop or an
executive session whether the meeting is held in
person or by means of electronic communications, for
the purpose of discussing, receiving comments from*
the public about, or acting upon a matter over which
the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power.
(b) "Meeting" does not mean:
(i) a chance meeting;
(ii) a social meeting; or
(iii) the convening of a public body that h a s
both legislative and executive responsibilities
where no public funds are appropriated for expenditure during the time the public body is
convened and:
(A) the public body is convened solely for
the discussion or implementation of administrative or operational matters for which no
formal action by the public body is required;
or
(B) the public body is convened solely for
the discussion or implementation of administrative or operational matters that would
not come before the public body for discussion or action.
(5) "Monitor" means to hear or observe, live, by audio
or video equipment, all of the public statements of each
member of the public body who is participating in a
meeting.
(6) "Participate" means the ability to communicate
with all of the members of a public body, either verbally or
electronically, so that each member of the public body can
hear or observe the communication.
(7) (a) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of the state or its
political subdivisions that:
(i) is created by the Utah Constitution, statute, rule, ordinance, or resolution;
(ii) consists of two or more persons;
(iii) expends, disburses, or is supported in
whole or in part by tax revenue; and
(iv) is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding the public's business,
(b) ^Public body" does not include a:
(i) political party, political group, or political
caucus; or
(ii) conference committee, rules committee, or
sifting committee of the Legislature.
(8) "Public statement? means a statement made in the
ordinary course of business of the public body with the
intent that all other members of the public body receive it.
(0) (a) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public body, unless otherwise defined by
applicable law.
(b) "Quorum" does not include a meeting of two
elected officials by themselves when no action, either
formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which
these elected oflicials have advisory power.
(10) "Recoixling" means an audio, or an audio and
video, record of the proceedings of a meeting that can be
used to review the proceedings of the meeting.
2007
52-4-104. Training.
The presiding officer of the public body shall ensure that the
members of the public body are provided with annual training
on the requirements of this chapter.
2006
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(c) A public body is in compliance with the provisions of
Subsection (3XaXn) by providing notice to a newspaper or
local media correspondent under the provisions of Subsection 63F-l-701(4Xd).
(4) A public body is encouraged to develop and use additional electronic means to provide notice of its meetings under
Subsection (3).
(5) (a) The notice requirement of Subsection (1) may be
disregarded if:
(i) because of unforeseen drcumstances it is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent
nature; and
(ii) the public body gives the best notice practicable
o£
(A) the time and place of the emergency meeting, and
(B) the topics to be considered at the emergency meeting.
(b) An emergency meeting of a public body may not be
held unless:
(i) an attempt has been made to notify all the
members of the public body; and
(ii) a majority of the members of the public body
approve the meeting.
(6) (a) A public notice that is required to include an agenda
under Subsection (1) shall provide reasonable specificity
to notify the public as to the topics to be considered at the
meeting. Each topic shall be listed under an agenda item
on the meeting agenda.
(b) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (6Xc), and at
the discretion of the presiding member of the public body
a topic raised by the public may be discussed during an
open meeting, even if the topic raised by the public was
not included in the agenda or advance public notice for the
meeting.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (5), relating to
emergency meetings, a public body may not take final
action on a topic in an open meeting unless the topic is:
(i) listed under an agenda item as required by
Subsection (6Xa); and
(ii) included with the advance public notice reqnired by this section.
2008
52-4-203. Minutes of open meetings — Public records
— Recording of meetings.
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (8), written minutes and a recording shall be kept of all open meetings.
(2) Written minutes of an open meeting shall include:
(a) the date, time, and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or
decided by the public body which may include a summary
of comments made by members of the public body;
(d) a record, by individual member, of each vote taken
by the public body;
(e) the name of each person who is not a member of the
public body, and upon recognition by the presiding member of the public body, provided testimony or comments to
the public body;
(f) the substance, in brie£ of the testimony or comments provided by the public under Subsection (2Xe); and
(g) any other information that any member requests be
entered in the minutes or recording.
(3) A recording of an open meeting shallf
(a) be a complete and unedited record of all open
portions of the meeting from the commencement of the
meeting through adjournment of the meeting; and
(b) be properly labeled or identified with the date, time,
and place of the meeting.
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(4) (a) The minutes and recordings of an open meeting are
public records and shall be available within a reasonable
time after the meeting.
(b) An open meeting record kept only by a recording
must be converted to written minutes within a reasonable
time upon request.
(5) All or any part of an open meeting may be independently recorded by any person in attendance if the recording
does not interfere with the conduct of the meeting.
(6) Minutes or recordings of an open meeting that are
required to be retained permanently shall b e maintained in or
converted to a format that meets long-term records storage
requirements.
(7) Written minutes and recordings of open meetings are
public records under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government
Records Access and Management Act, but written minutes
shall be the official record of action taken a t the meeting.
(8) Either written minutes or a recording shall be kept of:
(a) an open meeting that is a site visit or a traveling
tour, if no vote or action is taken by the public body; and
(b) an open meeting of a local district under Title 17B,
limited Purpose Local Government Entities — Local
Districts, or special service district under Title 17B,
Chapter 1, Special Service District Act, if the districts
annual budgeted expenditures for all funds, excluding
capital expenditures and debt service, are $50,000 or less.
2008

52-4-204. Closed meeting held upon v o t e of members —
Business — Reasons for m e e t i n g recorded.
(1) A closed meeting may be held:
(a) if a quorum is present; and
(b) if two-thirds of the members of the public body
present at an open meeting for which notice is given
under Section 52-4-202 vote to approve closing the meeting.
(2) A closed meeting is not allowed unless each matter
discussed in the closed meeting is permitted under Section
52-4-205.
(3) An ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or
appointment may not be approved at a closed meeting.
(4) The following information shall be publicly announced
and entered on the minutes of the open meeting at which the
closed meeting was approved:
(a) the reason or reasons for holding the closed meeting;
(b) the location where the closed meeting will be held;
and
(c) the vote by name, of each member of the public body,
either for or against the motion to hold the closed meeting.
(5) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require
any meeting to be closed to the public.
2006
52-4-205. Purposes of closed meetings.
(1) A closed meeting described under Section 52-4-204 may
only be held for:
(a) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of an individual;
(b) strategy sessions to discuss collective bargaining;
(c) strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably
imminent litigation;
(d) strategy sessions to discuss t h e purchase, exchange,
or lease of real property if public discussion of the transaction would:
(i) disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the
property under consideration; or
(ii) prevent the public body from completing the
transaction on the best possible terms;
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53-6-211. Revocation, suspension, or refusal of certification — Hearings — Grounds — Notice to
employer — Reporting.
(1) (a) The director may, upon the concurrence of the majority of the council, revoke, refuse, or suspend certification of a peace officer for cause.
(b) Except as provided under Subsection (6), the council shall give the person or peace officer involved prior
notice and an opportunity for a full hearing before the
council.
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the council,
may by rule designate a presiding officer to represent the
council in adjudicative proceedings or hearings before the
council.
(d) Any of the following constitute cause for action
under Subsection (l)(a):
(i) willful falsification of any information to obtain
certified status;
(ii) physical or mental disability affecting the employee's ability to perform his duties;
(iii) addiction to or the unlawful sale, possession,
or use of narcotics, drugs, or drug paraphernalia;
(iv) conviction of a felony or any crime involving
dishonesty, unlawful sexual conduct, physical violence, or driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs; or
(v) any conduct or pattern of conduct that would
tend to disrupt, diminish, or otherwise jeopardize
public trust and fidelity in law enforcement.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any expungement statute or rule
of any other jurisdiction, any conviction obtained in this
state or other jurisdiction may be considered for purposes
of this section.
(b) In this section, "conviction" includes a conviction
that has been expunged, dismissed, or treated in a similar
manner to either of these procedures.
(c) This provision applies to convictions entered both
before and after April 25, 1988.
(3) The director shall send notice to the governing body of
the political subdivision employing the peace officer and shall
receive information or comments concerning the peace officer
from the governing body or the agency employing the officer
before suspending or revoking that peace officer's certification.
(4) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures may not be
initiated by the council when an officer is terminated for
infraction of his agency's policies, general orders, or similar
guidelines of operation that do not amount to any of the causes
for denial, suspension, or revocation enumerated in Subsection (1).
(5) (a) Ifermination of a peace officer, whether voluntary or
involuntary, does not preclude revocation or subsequent
denial of peace officer certification status by the council if
the peace officer was terminated for any of the reas
under Subsection (1).
^
(b) Employment by another agency, or reinstatement f
a peace officer by his parent agency after terminati
whether the termination was voluntary or involuntar^
does not preclude revocation or subsequent denial f
peace officer certification status by the council if the t>ea
officer was terminated for any of the reasons unde
Subsection (1).
(6) (a) When the cause for action is conviction of a felonv
the proceedings prior to a recommendation shall be hm*
ited to an informal review of written documentation bv
the presiding officer.
(b) If the presiding officer determines that the peace
officer has been convicted of a felony, then the presiding
officer shall recommend revocation.
(c) The peace officer may request an informal hearing
before the presiding officer solely to present evidence that
there was no felony conviction.
(d) At the conclusion of an informal hearing, the presiding officer shall make a recommendation to the director
and the council.
(7) The chief, sheriff, or administrative officer of a law
enforcement agency is required to report to Peace Officer
Standards and Training all conduct of employees who are
DeaCP flffifPrQ
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63-6-211. Suspension or revocation of certification —
Right to a hearing — Grounds — Notice to
employer — Reporting.
(1) The council has authority to suspend or revoke the
certification of a peace officer, if the peace officer:
(a) willfully falsifies any information to obtain certification;
(b) has any physical or mental disability affecting the
peace officer's ability to perform duties;
(c) is addicted to alcohol or any controlled substance,
unless the peace officer reports the addiction to the
employer and to the director as part of a departmental
early intervention process;
(d) engages in conduct which is a state or federal
criminal offense, but not including a traffic offense that is
a class C misdemeanor or infraction;
(e) refuses to respond, or fails to respond truthfully, to
questions after having been issued a warning issued
based on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);
(f) engages in sexual conduct while on duty; or
(g) is dismissed from the armed forces of the Unites
States under dishonorable conditions.
(2) The council may not suspend or revoke the certification
°f a peace officer for a violation of a law enforcement agency's
P°licies, general orders, or guidelines of operation that do not
^ o u n t to a cause of action under Subsection (1).
(3) (a) The division is responsible for investigating officers
who are allegeo! to have engaged in conduct in violation of
Subsection (1).
(b) The division shall initiate all adjudicative proceedings under this section by providing to the peace officer
involved notice and an opportunity for a hearing before an
administrative law judge.
(c) All adjudicative proceedings under this section are
civil actions, notwithstanding whether the issue in the
adjudicative proceeding is a violation of statute that may
be prosecuted criminally.
(d) (i) The burden of proof on the division in an adjudicative proceeding under this section is by clear and
convincing evidence.
(ii) If a peace officer asserts an affirmative defense,
the peace officer has the burden of proof to establish
the affirmative defense by a preponderance oi me
evidence.
(e) If the administrative law judge issues findings of
fact and conclusions of law stating there is sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the officer engaged in conduct that is in violation of Subsection (1), the division
shall present the finding and conclusions issued by the
aobxunistrative law judge to the council.
(f) The division shall notify the chief, sheriff, or administrative officer of the police agency which employs the
involved peace officer of the investigation and shall provide any information or comments concerning the peace
officer received from that agency regarding the peace
officer to the council before a peace officer's certification
may be suspended or revoked.
(g) If the administrative law judge finds that there is
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the officer is in
violation of Subsection (1), the administrative law judge
shall dismiss the adjudicative proceeding.

(4) (a) The council shall review the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the information concerning th§
peace officer provided by the officer's employing agency
and determine whether to suspend or revoke the officer's
certification.
(b) A member of the council shall recuse him or herself
from consideration of an issue that is before the council if
the council member:
(i) has a personal bias for or against the officer;
(ii) has a substantial pecuniary interest in th§
outcome of the proceeding and may gain or lose som§
benefit from the outcome; or
(hi) employs, supervises, or works for the same law
enforcement agency as the officer whose case is before
the council.
(5) (a) Termination of a peace officer, whether voluntary or
involuntary, does not preclude suspension or revocation of
a peace officer's certification by the council if the peac§
officer was terminated for any of the reasons under
Subsection (1).
(b) Employment by another agency, or reinstatement of
a peace officer by the original employing agency after
termination by that agency, whether the termination was
voluntary or involuntary, does not preclude suspension or
revocation of a peace officer's certification by the council if
the peace officer was terminated for any of the reasons
under Subsection (1).
(6) A chief, sheriff, or administrative officer of a law enforcement agency who is made aware of an allegation against a
peace officer employed by that agency that involves conduct in
violation of Subsection (1) shall investigate the allegation and
report to the division if the allegation is found to be true.
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